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Fighting to Lose: How the German Secret Intelligence Service Helped 
the Allies Win the Second World War. John Bryden. Toronto: 
Dundurn Press, 2014. Pp. 415.
The last fifteen years have seen a resurgence of literature on Second 
World War intelligence activities from both the Allied and Axis sides. 
The release of previously classified government documents from 
the war and its surrounding years have opened the doors for new 
debate and perspectives on the role of intelligence activities during 
the Second World War. With the release of these documents, new 
insights can be gained and new assessments made connecting secret 
intelligence activities between nations at war previously unseen. 
John Bryden’s nineteen-chapter book Fighting to Lose: How the 
German Secret Intelligence Service Helped the Allies Win the Second 
World War seeks to provide evidence that the Abwehr purposefully 
provided intelligence to the Allies through a series of double and 
triple-agents in hopes of bringing the United States into the war as 
Britain’s saviour. 
Bryden’s examination of Second World War secret intelligence 
organizations highlights a connection between the Abwehr, German 
Secret Intelligence, and Allied intelligence agencies, mi5 in Britain and 
the FBI in the United States. Based on incomplete archival evidence, 
Bryden infers that Admiral Canaris, head of the German Abwehr, 
purposefully planted agents for the British to exploit. His intention 
was to inform the British about Hitler’s invasion of Czechoslovakia, 
Operation Barbarossa, and the ultimate attack on Pearl Harbor that 
moved the United States to enter the war (p. 12). What mi5 did with 
this information is a point of contention for Bryden and one which he 
dwells on frequently while building his argument. 
Bryden provides a note to the reader at the beginning of the 
book in hopes of making the reading experience easier by offering 
some historical context before moving to the introduction. The 
three-page introduction outlines the inspiration of this project as Ian 
Colvin’s 1951 book Chief of Intelligence that offers the first mention 
of Admiral Canaris as a “British agent” during the Second World 
War (p. 12). Where Colvin relied on word of mouth and hearsay to 
develop his book, Bryden jumped into the official records released in 
the 1990s and the numerous books subsequently released books to 
find evidence of the idea that Canaris exercised anti-Nazi sentiments 
by providing Allied intelligence agencies with crucial elements of 
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information, namely the attack on Pearl Harbor, which brought the 
United States into the Second World War. 
Bryden uses a chronological sequence of events to provide a 
backdrop on which to build his theory. He begins by providing a 
detailed synopsis of the state of secret intelligence agencies in Germany, 
Britain, and the United States leading into the war. The disparity 
between German and Allied intelligence agency preparation leading 
into the war is quite large. Admiral Canaris conducted research and 
developed methods to ensure the viability of the Abwehr in what 
would turn into the Second World War. By implementing guidance 
from his predecessor and mentor Colonel Walter Nicolai, Canaris 
created an intelligence organization capable of providing intelligence 
on military, diplomatic, and economic to German leadership as 
codified in Nicolai’s “espionage ‘bible’” The German Secret Service 
(London, 1924), which was first published in English and largely 
ignored by mi5 (p. 52). This theme of British inadequacy continues 
from the prologue to the conclusion, with numerous examples of 
outdated methods and thinking in the upper-echelons of British 
intelligence services (p. 59).
The author loosely connects Canaris directly to the various 
double agents discussed throughout the book. However, he clearly 
describes how the Abwehr informed mi5 of planned operations. Not 
all the information was acted upon by British intelligence, based on 
their belief that Germany was sub-par when it came to intelligence 
gathering. One of only a few mentions of Canaris’ direct involvement 
in the schemes of supplying information to mi5 comes from the 
perspective of one of the “double-agents” employed in the beginning 
of 1941 that met with Stewart Menzies, mi6 Chief (p. 174). Most 
connections with Canaris made throughout the book are two or 
three times removed. This leads one to think that, perhaps it was 
not Canaris that directed information be passed to Britain, but a 
subordinate that shared similar anti-Nazi views and Canaris simply 
allowed the actions. 
Bryden clearly defines his aim and argument at the beginning 
of the book. However, the first half of the text covers the ineptitude 
of mi5 and mi6 more than the supposed connection between Canaris 
and Allied intelligence. Not until the later chapters of the book does 
the argument come to fruition. Chapter 15 provides a timeline of 
events leading up to Pearl Harbor and the mishandling of intelligence 
that implied a pending attack on Pearl Harbor by the Japanese. 
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Bryden finally makes a solid accounting of how the Abwehr provides 
sound information to both Britain and the United States encouraging 
them to prepare for attack in the Pacific based on a questionnaire 
supplied to one of the German triple-agents, Dusko Popov (p. 216). 
Until the final chapters, much of the preceding information 
leads one to believe the book seeks to explain that mi5 and mi6 
were inept at running an effective intelligence organization. Then 
one realizes that, chapter-by-chapter, Bryden builds his argument by 
incrementally covering the Second World War up to the entrance of 
the United States after Pearl Harbor. Each chapter covers a specified 
time period ranging from a few months to a few years. Bryden 
develops his argument using both primary documents and secondary 
sources from those directly involved with the “double-cross system” 
and the xx Committee. He draws his conclusions from the gaps in 
primary documentation and connects events, in some cases, with no 
direct support (p. 179). 
John Bryden’s background as politician, journalist, and 
accomplished military historian make this book a relatively easy read. 
The layman with little knowledge of the inner workings of intelligence 
agencies, specifically those of the mid-twentieth century, will find 
Bryden’s style of writing easy to comprehend. He clearly outlines 
the structures of each intelligence service and provides background 
information on the efficacy of each organization. On the other hand, 
he often switches between codename, case number, and name when 
he refers to the many double agents throughout the book. 
I would recommend this book to any person interested in the 
history of intelligence and espionage. It provides a unique lens from 
which to view secret intelligence activities during the Second World 
War and is easily digestible for an undergraduate student. This 
book would also be a beneficial read for professional intelligence 
personnel dealing in human intelligence and espionage. Bryden 
succinctly outlines the connections one must make between tidbits 
of information to create a larger understanding of events. He also 
provides the aspiring intelligence historian with a historiography of 
sorts for the study of Second World War espionage that would give 
any historian a head start on research. Fighting to Lose is worth the 
read if for nothing more than an enjoyable experience. 
joshua mccarty
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